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Abstract
Traditional economic interpretations have not been successful in explaining differences in
saving rates across countries. One hypothesis is that savings respond to cultural specific
social norms. The accepted view in economics so far is that culture does not have any effect
on savings. We revisit this evidence using a novel dataset, which allows us to study the sav-
ing behavior of up to three generations of immigrants in the United Kingdom. Against the
backdrop of existing evidence, we find that cultural preferences are an important explana-
tion for cross-country differences in saving behavior, and their relevance persists up to three
generations.
Introduction
Savings are important drivers of economic growth and are pre-requisite to the sustainability of
pension systems and the international balance of trade. The correlates of differences in saving
rates have been well-studied in the literature and include the effect of demographics, differ-
ences in income and growth rates, social security systems, tax systems and housing price differ-
entials, and financial markets and liberalization [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. However, even after
controlling for differences in these covariates, a large part of the differences in saving rates
across societies remain unexplained [8].
One hypothesis is that savings respond to cultural specific norms. Previous evidence on the
relevance of culture for saving behavior comes from [9]. The authors used data from the Cana-
dian Surveys of Family Expenditures. They studied the saving behavior of first-generation
immigrants in Canada and test whether saving rates varied systematically by place of origin.
All immigrants face the same institutional and economic environment, the one of Canada,
therefore any systematic difference across places of origin, if any, could be attributed to cul-
ture. The authors found that saving patterns did not vary systematically by place of origin.
These findings formed the basis of the commonly accepted view that culture does not influence
saving behavior.
The original study [9] had various limitations: first, the sample of immigrants was small,
second the classification of the place of origin was too broad (the authors did not have any
information about the country of origin but only about broad geographical regions), and third
wealth was not measured properly.
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In this paper, we re-examine the hypothesis that culture matters for saving behavior, by
looking at the saving behavior of three generations of immigrants in the United Kingdom and
using data from the Understanding Society Survey, the largest UK household longitudinal
survey.
Like in the original paper [9], the identification strategy relies on the possibility to observe
immigrants from different countries of origin in the same environment (in this case, the
United Kingdom). This allows distinguishing cultural determinants of savings from factors
like tax code, social security system and any other institutional and economic factor more
generally.
The Understanding Society Survey presents numerous advantages. First, it allows us to
identify first, second (also defined children of immigrants: individuals born in the UK with
parents born abroad) and third generation immigrants (i.e. individuals born in the UK, with
parents born in the UK, but with both grand-parents born abroad). The original study [9] had
information only on first-generation immigrants, for whom problems of selection and disrup-
tion due to immigration are a serious concern. While first-generation immigrants in the UK
could also experience the same issues of selection and disruption due to immigration, for sec-
ond and third generations these concerns should be more limited. However, there is still a
potential concern since second and even third-generation immigrants could be discriminated
against or might feel conflicted between the UK and their parental country of origin.
Second, the UK is one of the largest immigrant-receiving states with a large variation in the
country of origin of up to three generations of immigrants.
Third, the dataset contains detailed information on both actual and self-reported savings
for a large sample of immigrants, their children and their grandchildren from different coun-
tries of origin.
Various contributions to the economics literature have studied the behavior of immigrants
to show the relevance of cultural values for different economic outcomes, such as living
arrangements [10], female labor force participation and fertility [11], trust [12] and preferences
for redistribution [13]. For a review on the relevance of culture on economic outcomes, see
[14] and [15]. All these contributions study the persistence of cultural traits for first or second-
generation immigrants. None of the studies mentioned above has been able to go beyond the
analysis of second-generation immigrants, as the datasets used did not contain any informa-
tion on the country of origin of one individual’s grandparents. An exception is the study by
[16] that goes beyond second-generation immigrants and looks at the behavior of first, second
and ‘higher generation immigrants’ (higher generation in their context are third, fourth or fur-
ther generation) in the United States using the General Social Survey. Importantly, the authors
report evidence of persistence and evolution of different types of values and show that some
cultural traits, such as family and gender values, political views, and deep personal religious
values, are very persistent. Other traits, instead (such as attitudes towards cooperation, chil-
dren’s independence, and attitudes towards sexuality) tend to exhibit less persistence. The
authors do not look at saving behavior in their analysis.
To study the relevance of cultural norms we link each immigrant to the saving rates from
their country of origin. We use a measure of savings rate over GDP, calculated from 1990 until
2010, as a proxy for culture. We attribute the association found in our data between the behav-
iour of immigrants and the saving rate in the country of origin to differences in cultural beliefs
across immigrant groups. Looking at various generations of immigrants constitutes a sort of
“natural experiment”. When migrants move to a new country, they leave behind the economic
and institutional conditions that determine their saving behavior in the country of origin, they
however bring with them their cultural beliefs. Savings/GDP at the aggregate level will depend
on the distribution of beliefs about the importance of savings, and this distribution varies
Saving behavior and culture
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across countries, hence reflecting variation in culture. If this aggregate variable has then
explanatory power for the variation in immigrants’ saving outcomes, even after controlling for
their individual economic attributes, only the cultural component of this variable can be
responsible for this correlation. This is because the economic and institutional environment is
now the same for immigrants from different countries and it is the one of the United King-
dom. The mechanisms behind the correlation of saving behavior of different generations and
saving outcomes in the country of origin can be attributed to intergenerational cultural trans-
mission, according to which parents tend to transmit their beliefs to their children (see [17]).
Nonetheless, the measure of savings/GDP from the country of origin proxies an average effect
of cultural transmission. A substantial heterogeneity can be at play for different immigrant
groups, for example the frequency of contacts with the country of origin or the size of the com-
munity of immigrants in the neighbourhood where immigrants live. Unfortunately, the
Understanding Society Survey does not contain any information on any of these variables, and
we cannot study in this paper this type of heterogeneity.
Material and methods
Variable construction and definition
Our main sample consists of individuals older than thirteen. We define the first generation as
immigrants who are not born in the UK; second generation as those who are born in the UK
but with at least one parent not born in the UK; and third generation, as those who are born in
the UK to parents both of whom are also born in the UK, but have at least one grandparent,
who is not born in the UK. This is the formal definition of immigrant generations given in the
Understanding Society Survey dataset. Natives are those with all grandparents born in the UK.
The number of observations for each country of origin is provided in the S1 Table of the Sup-
porting Information.
Proxy for culture. Our proxy for culture, savings/GDP of the country of origin, is taken
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Gross domestic savings are calculated
as GDP less final consumption expenditures (i.e. total consumption). We pooled data over the
1990–2010 period to minimize measurement error. The results are however robust to different
time ranges (for example if we consider the 1990–1999 and 2000–2010 periods separately).
Saving rates across countries for our sample of interest are also highly correlated in the two
periods (0.87) and have very similar means (20.3 and 20.7) and standard deviations (7 and
9.04).
Outcome variables. We use three measures of saving behavior.
1. Total amount of saving: This variable is the self-reported “monthly amount of savings”. This
variable is available in the Understanding Society Survey dataset for the respondents who
answers “yes” to the “propensity to save” question reported below. These people were asked
another follow-up question in wave 2 and wave 4 to collect self-reported data on the
monthly amount of savings: “About how much on average do you personally manage to
save a month?”. We take the log of this variable and, in order not to lose observations for
individuals reporting zero, we added one pound to the total amount reported.
2. Propensity to save: This is a self reported binary measure of saving behavior, where 1 indi-
cates that an individual answers “yes” to the following survey question in wave 2 and wave
4. “Do you save any amount of your income, for example by putting something away now
and then in a bank, building society, or Post Office account, other than to meet regular
bills? Please include share purchase schemes, ISA’s and Tessa accounts.” The person can
answer either yes or no.
Saving behavior and culture
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3. Positive Savings: We constructed an objective measure of actual savings by using a large set
of wealth variables in the wealth module of the survey in waves 2 and 4. Net worth is defined
as the sum of housing equity, car equity and liquid financial net worth. We then calculated
change in “net worth” from wave 2 to wave 4 as [Net worth(w4)−Net worth(w2)]/ 10000.
Our variable of interest, “positive savings”, takes the value of the change if the wealth has
increased between two time periods or zero if wealth has decreased or stayed the same over
the same period.
Control variables. Our control variables include age dummies, dummy indicators for
female and for whether the person is married, number of children, log of monthly total house-
hold net income, which is a derived variable available in the dataset (This variable can take
negative values, and it is top-coded +/- £20,000. We added 13771.8 + 1 to all observations
before taking the log because -13771.8 is the lowest value. This adjustment is done so that we
do not loose observations when logs are taken). We also control for employment status (we
include dummies for individuals who are unemployed and out of the labor force, the excluded
group are the employed), education (we include dummies for secondary education, A-level
degree, other higher degree, and college and above; the excluded group includes individuals
with the lowest level of education, “no qualification” or “other qualification”), paternal educa-
tion (we include dummies for whether the father left school with no qualification, whether the
father had some qualification, post-school qualification, or college or more; the excluded
group are fathers who did not go to school) and occupation fixed effects. We also test the
robustness of our results to the inclusion of a measure of permanent income (S3 Table). This
measure is calculated using a procedure similar to [18], [19] and, to a certain extent, [20]: we
regress our measure of log net household income on all individual characteristics, such as flexi-
ble age dummies, gender, marital status, number of children, education, occupational class,
region dummies and wave dummies. The predicted income using this regression is used as a
measure of individual-specific permanent income (i.e. residuals would constitute the transi-
tory income).
Descriptive analysis
Before starting our empirical analysis, we first examine whether there exists a systematic corre-
lation between saving rates in the country of origin and saving behavior among the three gen-
erations of immigrants. We report the correlations for the logarithm of the total amount of
savings among immigrants and saving rates in the countries of origin in Figs 1–3. A number of
facts are apparent from them. First, saving rates are strongly correlated with savings in the
country of origin: coming from cultures with high saving rates is reflected in higher saving
rates among immigrants in the United Kingdom. Second, these correlations are strong, not
only for immigrants and their children, but also for third-generation immigrants. Finally, Figs
1–3 also show that the relationship is not driven by a small number of countries.
Empirical analysis
The differences in saving rates among immigrants shown in Figs 1–3 could be driven by indi-
vidual characteristics or family background characteristics or by particular economic condi-
tions of the place where migrants decide to live. We, therefore, turn to OLS multivariate
regression estimates of the relationship between saving behavior among immigrants and sav-
ing in the country of origin. Using a multivariate regression framework allows us to account
for a host of other factors that may also affect savings. Without appropriate controls, we run
Saving behavior and culture
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the risk of capturing a spurious correlation between the unobserved factors and saving in the
country of origin.
Our empirical analysis takes care of these concerns by estimating the following equation:
Yic ¼ aðSavings=GDPÞc þ bXi þ yXitþdt þ mr þ mr  dt þ εict
where Yic are our outcomes of interest (the logarithm of the reported amount of savings, a
dummy indicating whether the individual is saving or not, and savings calculated using differ-
ences in wealth). Xi and Xit are time invariant and time variant individual controls described
above. Our specification also includes a full set of wave and regional dummies (δt and μr).
These are the baseline controls used in the first three columns of each table. From columns
4–6 we also add all the non-linear interactions between region and wave fixed effects (μr  δt)
to control for regional specific trends that could be driving differences in savings as a result of
differences in economic conditions. In this specification, we also include a full set of dummies
for the education of the father, described above. The standard errors are clustered at the coun-
try of origin level. Descriptive statistics are provided in the S2 Table.
Results and discussion
The estimates for saving rates are reported in Table 1. From the regression estimates, we see
the same pattern emerging as in Figs 1–3. Immigrants coming from countries with high saving
rates also tend to save more in the United Kingdom. In addition, the importance of culture
plays a role up until the third generation. The coefficients are not only statistically significant,
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Fig 1. Partial correlation plot: Log (amount saved) for first generation immigrants. Log (amount saved) for first
generation immigrants is the logarithm of the self-reported monthly amount of saving. The saving rate in the countries of
origin indicates the average gross domestic savings over GDP from 1990–2010.
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but they are also meaningful in magnitude. Based upon the estimates from column 1, a one
standard deviation change in the country of origin savings rate is associated with an increase
of saving rates of .051 standard deviations in the first generation, .040 standard deviation in
the second generation and .025 standard deviation in the third. The impact seems to be declin-
ing across generations. The effect is also meaningful when compared to other economic factors
such as the level of education: for the first generation, the effect of savings in the country of ori-
gin is equal to forty-one percent of the effect of having a college degree (for which the beta
coefficient is equal to 0.104) and fifty-one percent of the effect of income (for which the beta
coefficient is equal to 0.124). The effect of culture in the regressions with the extended set of
controls (columns 4–6) shows a similar pattern, but with almost no decline from the first to
the second generation. The effect on the third generation also loses significance, although the
size of the coefficient remains of similar magnitude.
In the Supporting Information, we show that differences in culture are also important to
explain the propensity to save and we find strong effects, in terms of both magnitude and sig-
nificance (S4 Table).
One of the potential concerns with Table 1 is that saving rates might suffer from self-reporting
bias. To address such a concern, our dataset contains records on individual’s wealth, which allow
us to calculate individual’s specific savings from wealth differences across time to match the same
estimates as in Table 1. S5 Table reports the estimates of regressing saving rates based on wealth
differences from wave 2 to wave 4 on the country of origin savings rates. The right-hand side vari-
ables are measured in wave 4. The results are consistent with the other two saving measures. The
effect of culture on the change in wealth has a similar impact across the three generations.
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Fig 2. Partial correlation plot: Log (amount saved) for second generation immigrants. Log (amount saved) for second
generation immigrants is the log of the self-reported monthly amount of saving divided by the net monthly household income. The
saving rate in the countries of origin indicates the average gross domestic savings over GDP from 1990–2010.
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Fig 3. Partial correlation plot: Log (amount saved) for third generation immigrants. Log (amount saved) for third
generation immigrants is the log of the self-reported monthly amount of saving divided by the net monthly household
income. The saving rate in the countries of origin indicates the average gross domestic savings over GDP from 1990–2010.
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Table 1. ’Log-amount saved’ self-reported amount of (positive) savings.
Variables 1st Gen 2nd Gen 3rd Gen 1st Gen (b) 2nd Gen (b) 3rd Gen (b)
Dom. savings/GDP 1.520 1.184 0.849 1.634 1.665 0.772
(2.782) (2.287) (1.796) (2.797) (2.914) (1.584)
Female 0.018 -0.049 -0.069 0.001 -0.051 -0.062
(0.225) (0.816) (0.833) (0.007) (0.866) (0.892)
Married -0.162 0.001 0.282 -0.159 0.007 0.265
(1.836) (0.008) (1.847) (1.518) (0.074) (1.965)
Number of children -0.142 -0.183 -0.302 -0.141 -0.230 -0.338
(2.759) (2.892) (7.531) (2.718) (3.657) (7.973)
Log Monthly Income 2.549 3.113 1.775 2.590 3.775 1.604
(4.642) (5.937) (1.885) (3.926) (6.618) (1.715)
Education (Ref. No Qualification)
College and above 0.500 0.763 0.717 0.537 0.944 0.839
(3.994) (6.595) (5.230) (3.979) (7.551) (6.186)
Other higher degree 0.282 0.268 0.571 0.301 0.544 0.711
(2.204) (1.503) (3.549) (2.571) (3.036) (4.567)
A-level degree 0.238 0.119 0.494 0.288 0.180 0.488
(2.872) (0.833) (5.702) (2.902) (1.254) (4.702)
Secondary education 0.224 0.129 0.243 0.302 0.211 0.354
(Continued)
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Conclusions
This study examines the effect of culture and its persistence on savings. We show evidence of a
robust association between immigrant saving behavior and the saving rates in their country of
Table 1. (Continued)
Variables 1st Gen 2nd Gen 3rd Gen 1st Gen (b) 2nd Gen (b) 3rd Gen (b)
(3.039) (1.159) (1.535) (4.130) (1.371) (1.793)
Employment Status (Ref: Employed)
Unemployed -0.475 -0.350 -0.766 -0.491 -0.456 -0.803
(2.051) (2.014) (2.340) (1.882) (1.935) (2.252)
Out of Labor Force -0.305 -0.096 -0.350 -0.244 -0.171 -0.363
(1.314) (0.499) (1.313) (0.998) (0.691) (1.324)
Current Occupational Class (NS-SEC8) (Ref: Inapplicable or no occupation)
Large employers & higher management 2.468 1.663 1.483 0.093 -0.167 -0.011
(5.734) (4.987) (3.972) (0.787) (1.408) (0.018)
Higher professional 1.931 1.455 1.701 0.192 -0.019 0.108
(5.618) (5.648) (3.303) (1.530) (0.099) (0.153)
Lower management & professional 1.103 1.256 1.002 0.348 -0.161 0.258
(3.814) (5.856) (2.966) (2.037) (0.772) (0.410)
Intermediate 0.871 0.985 0.486 0.216 -0.271 0.148
(3.062) (6.476) (1.344) (1.446) (1.389) (0.220)
Small employers 0.220 0.560 0.063 2.507 1.575 1.375
(0.737) (3.263) (0.223) (5.909) (4.315) (3.169)
Lower supervisory & technical 0.772 1.103 0.675 1.750 1.270 1.533
(1.995) (4.006) (2.855) (4.386) (4.659) (2.592)
Semi-routine 0.415 0.982 0.674 1.033 1.174 1.011
(1.626) (5.437) (1.774) (3.469) (4.669) (2.822)
Routine 0.272 0.305 0.003 0.764 0.929 0.570
(1.227) (1.398) (0.011) (2.438) (5.435) (1.594)
Father’s Education (Ref. Father did not go to School)
Father left school with no qualification 0.278 0.439 0.055
(0.820) (1.284) (0.210)
Father some qualification 0.617 0.935 0.873
(1.353) (2.484) (2.592)
Father post-school qualification 0.442 0.906 0.693
(1.507) (3.398) (1.561)
Father university or higher degree 0.213 0.358 -0.174
(0.860) (1.089) (0.463)
Constant -23.765 -29.770 -16.830 -24.041 -35.651 -15.454
(4.647) (5.680) (1.817) (3.898) (5.818) (1.717)
R2 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.20
N 5,171 3,746 2,371 3,812 2,616 1,973
Notes:
 p<0.1
 p<0.05
 p<0.01.
All specifications include age dummies, region dummies and wave dummies. The columns denoted by (b) also include, as controls, region and wave interactions
together with paternal education. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202290.t001
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origin that persists up to the third generation. Our results are consistent across different mea-
sures of savings (two self-reported savings measures and savings calculated as wealth change
over time). These results go against the prevailing evidence suggesting that culture does not
play a role in shaping savings behavior, and instead indicate that culture cannot be disregarded
in the study of saving differences across countries.
Supporting information
S1 Table. List of countries of origin and number of observations for different generations
of immigrants.
(DOCX)
S2 Table. Summary statistics.
(DOCX)
S3 Table. Log amount saved, controlling for permanent income. All specifications include
age dummies, region dummies, wave dummies and eight occupational class indicators (as in
Table 1). The columns denoted by (b) also include, as controls, region and wave interactions
together with paternal education. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.
(DOCX)
S4 Table. Propensity to save: Probit estimates for whether an individual saves or not.
(DOCX)
S5 Table. Positive savings: “Amount of increase in wealth between wave 2 and 4”. 
p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.1. All specifications include full age and region dummies; the specifi-
cations in columns (b) additionally include father’s education as controls. Standard errors are
clustered at the country of origin level.
(DOCX)
S1 File. Replication package. This zip file contains the STATA do-file used to replicate the
results of the manuscript. The Understanding Society Survey data can be obtained from:
https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk.
(ZIP)
Acknowledgments
We thank the editor and two anonymous referees for comments that greatly improved the
paper. We also thank Belen Saenz de Miera Juarez for her outstanding research assistance.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: Joan Costa-Font, Paola Giuliano, Berkay Ozcan.
Formal analysis: Joan Costa-Font, Paola Giuliano, Berkay Ozcan.
Funding acquisition: Paola Giuliano, Berkay Ozcan.
Investigation: Berkay Ozcan.
Supervision: Paola Giuliano.
Writing – original draft: Paola Giuliano.
Writing – review & editing: Joan Costa-Font, Paola Giuliano, Berkay Ozcan.
Saving behavior and culture
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202290 September 12, 2018 9 / 10
References
1. Kotlikoff LJ, What Determines Savings? The MIT Press Books, Cambridge, MA; 1989:1.
2. Edwards S. Why are Latin America’s savings rates so low? An international comparative analysis. Jour-
nal of Development Economics. 1996 Oct 1; 51(1):5–44.
3. Masson PR, Bayoumi T, Samiei H. International evidence on the determinants of private saving. The
World Bank Economic Review. 1998 Sep 1; 12(3):483–501.
4. Higgins M. Demography, national savings, and international capital flows. International Economic
Review. 1998 May 1:343–69.
5. Bandiera O, Caprio G, Honohan P, Schiantarelli F. Does financial reform raise or reduce saving?
Review of Economics and Statistics. 2000 May; 82(2):239–63.
6. Laitner J. Structural change and economic growth. The Review of Economic Studies. 2000 Jul 1; 67
(3):545–61.
7. Case KE, Quigley JM, Shiller RJ. Comparing wealth effects: the stock market versus the housing mar-
ket. Advances in Macroeconomics. 2005 Jun 28; 5 (1).
8. Cigno A, Rosati FC. Jointly determined saving and fertility behaviour: theory, and estimates for Ger-
many, Italy, UK and USA. European Economic Review. 1996 Nov 1; 40(8):1561–89. PMID: 12292061
9. Carroll CD, Rhee BK, Rhee C. Are There Cultural Effects on Saving? Some Cross-Sectional Evidence.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1994 Aug 1; 109 (3), 685–699
10. Giuliano P. Living arrangements in western Europe: Does cultural origin matter?. Journal of the Euro-
pean Economic Association. 2007 Sep 1; 5(5):927–52.
11. Fernandez R, Fogli A. Culture: An empirical investigation of beliefs, work, and fertility. American Eco-
nomic Journal: Macroeconomics. 2009 Jan; 1(1):146–77.
12. Algan Y, Cahuc P. Inherited trust and growth. American Economic Review. 2010 Dec; 100(5):2060–92.
13. Luttmer EF, Singhal M. Culture, context, and the taste for redistribution. American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy. 2011 Feb; 3(1):157–79.
14. Guiso L, Sapienza P, Zingales L. Does culture affect economic outcomes?. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives. 2006 Jun; 20(2):23–48.
15. Alesina A, Giuliano P. Culture and institutions. Journal of Economic Literature. 2015 Dec; 53(4):898–
944.
16. Giavazzi F, Petkov I, Schiantarelli F. Culture: Persistence and evolution. National Bureau of Economic
Research; 2014 May 29.
17. Bisin A, Verdier T. The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences. Journal of
Economic Theory. 2001 Apr 1; 97(2):298–319.
18. Musgrove P. Permanent household income and consumption in urban South America. The American
Economic Review. 1979 Jun 1:355–68.
19. Deaton A. The analysis of household surveys: a microeconometric approach to development policy.
The World Bank; 1997 Jul 31.
20. Altonji JG, Doraszelski U. The role of permanent income and demographics in black/white differences
in wealth. Journal of Human Resources. 2005 Jan 1; 40(1):1–30.
Saving behavior and culture
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202290 September 12, 2018 10 / 10
